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A commentary on
Labels, cognomes and cyclic computation: an ethological perspective
by Murphy, E. (2015). Front. Psychol. 6:715. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00715
Murphy (2015) seeks to gain insight into the phylogeny of the human language faculty by
adopting a computational perspective. After surveying the ethology literature in an attempt
to isolate what is lacking in other species at the computational level, Murphy claims that
the process of Labeling, well studied in theoretical linguistics, is what is specific to human
language.
We applaud Murphy’s effort to address the issue of language phylogeny in such a
computationally explicit fashion, but we would like to take this opportunity to highlight a few
challenges to building adequate cognitive phylogenies that Murphy does not seem to appreciate
enough.
While Murphy’s critical remarks toward the “Chomsky hierarchy” as a tool to build biologically-
sound cognitive phylogenies (Fitch, 2015) echoes some of our own concerns (Boeckx, 2013;
Benítez-Burraco and Boeckx, 2014), we find his appeal to computational principles like Labeling
to be equally inadequate. Quite apart from our skepticism coming from narrowly linguistic
considerations surrounding Labeling (Boeckx, 2014), our main reason for not siding with Murphy
is that issues of cognitive phylogenies must be firmly grounded in comparative studies. But it is
well-known that linguistic principles of the sort Murphy trades in resist meaningful comparison
across cognitive domains and species.
As Newport (2010: p. 282) has correctly observed, “the generative tradition in language has given
us an elegant and detailed articulation of how these principles work themselves out in language;
whether the same principles apply in detail to any other domain remains to be seen, since few
comparably sophisticated analyses have ever been done of other complex cognitive domains.”
The generative tradition took some 50 years to arrive at the sophisticated level of computational
characterization that Murphy seeks to exploit. Nothing like it exists in other domains of human
cognition, let alone in other species. Accordingly, how are we to determine if, say, the “cognome”
of baboons contains the Labeling operation when they conceptualize dominance hierarchies?
It is not that questions of this type are meaningless, it is just that they are inapplicable
in practice, casting doubt on the current feasibility of what Murphy calls computational
ethology.
We also find it difficult to believe that operations like Labeling are formulated at the right
level of granularity to enable the formulation of linking hypotheses between the cognome and
the dynome, connectome, and genome. As argued in Boeckx and Theofanopoulou (2014), notions
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of computation grounded in brain processes, of the sort
advocated by Buzsáki (2010) and Buzsáki and Watson
(2012), stand a much better chance of providing the
right bridging tools between mind and brain. They also
can rely on the conservation of brain rhythms across a
wide range of species (Buzsáki et al., 2013) to begin to
draw meaningful comparisons across species and cognitive
domains.
Despite some supporting remarks toward our work, we think
that Murphy fails to truly appreciate both the necessity and
the primacy of cross-disciplinary, multi-dimensional hypotheses
of the sort we have advocated (Boeckx and Theofanopoulou,
2014). In the absence of these, it is quite natural to weaken
the Darwinian notion of continuity (as Murphy in fact does
with his Weak Continuity Hypothesis), because principles at
one level (say, the phenome or cognome) tend to be so
specific as to render descent scenarios difficult to articulate.
And it is not only this difficulty that worries us, but mainly
the fact that phenotypic diversity across species reveals only
an apparent gulf (hence, apparent discontinuity) without
discernible effects on the cognome. Attempts to detect how
such effects percolate downstream succeed to the extent
that some traits can indeed be decomposed with a “top-
down” approach. But, in our view, it is clear that what
is needed instead is a “bottom-up” approach (De Waal
and Ferrari, 2010), where sharp differences in the phenome
would be conceived as confluences of a hodgepodge of
recognizable, reconstructed features. From this standpoint,
behavioral-phenotypic experiments across species would only
serve as “bootstrapping” bottom-up hypotheses. We are thus
convinced that evolution’s “tinkering” character—in the spirit of
Darwin’s notion of “descent”—is to be found in those deeper,
more elementary, widely shared traits, as opposed to apparent-
species-specific behaviors. It is in fact this specificity that
tends to promote cladistic formulations of cognitive phylogenies
(Fitch et al., 2010). But once multi-dimensional hypotheses
are formulated, such traditional phylogenetic representations
become untenable (Theofanopoulou, 2015; Theofanopoulou and
Boeckx, in preparation).
Consider, for example, the origin of “syllables” in human
language, an issue very much related to Labeling. Syllables in
language are distinct from “syllables” in the vocal outputs of
other species (Samuels, 2011). Accordingly, we could be tempted
to posit a human-specific operation—Syllabify—to capture this
fact. But work by Ghazanfar and Takahashi (2014) has revealed
that a decomposition of syllables in terms of brain rhythms
(dynome) favors an evolutionary scenario according to which the
mechanism of syllabification is rooted in the mechanism of lip-
smacking attested in non-linguistic primates. Computationally
speaking, lip-smacking and speech are distinct at the phenome
level, but mechanistically (in the dynome) they converge, and
provide the basis for elementary cognitive functions (attention,
working memory; see Martins and Boeckx, 2014). Murphy’s
computational ethology approach would be unable to capture it,
but the neuroethological approach of Ghazanfar and colleagues
does, by resorting to elementary and generic operations framed
in brain terms.
In sum, we fully endorse the “divide-and-conquer” approach
to cognitive traits that Murphy adopts, but we want to stress
the need to recognize that such an approach will only be
successful if the “divide” step is combined with a linking step
across phenome, cognome, dynome, connectome, and genome.
In Aristotle’s terms, it is this bridging step that will make us grasp
both the Continuity—“in essence” and the Discontinuity—“in
appearance.”
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